Rationality, Normativity, and Emotions: An Assessment of Max Weber’s Typology of Social Action by Minner, Frédéric
Klēsis – 2020 : 48 – Perspectives wébériennes en philosophie 
 
 235 
RATIONALITY, NORMATIVITY, AND EMOTIONS: AN ASSESSMENT OF MAX 
WEBER’S TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL ACTION 
Frédéric Minner 
(Université de Genève, IRS / Université de Lausanne, THEMA) 
 
 
I. Introduction1 
Social scientists have given different answers to the question of how many types of social 
actions2 there are. Weber3 for instance described four types of social action: purposive 
rationality (pure rationality), value rationality, traditions/habits, and affective actions. 
More recently, Elster4 identified three types of actions: interest, reason (morality) and 
passion; and opposes emotions and rationality by saying that emotions tend to subvert 
rationality5; and Boudon6 believed that various kinds of rationality (instrumental/utili-
tarian, cognitive, axiological), but also moral sentiments7 play competing and complemen-
tary explanatory roles in social explanation. Weber, Elster and Boudon, each in their own 
terminology, identified different types of social actions by distinguishing between ration-
ality, normativity and affectivity. By analytical reduction one can say that these thinkers 
identified three types of social actions:  rational, normative and affective actions which in 
their work represent distinct explanations, that can oppose, substitute or complement. By 
critically discussing Weber’s typology and by elaborating on it, I will challenge these 
views, and defend that rational, normative and affective actions are not three distinct 
                                                      
1 I would like to thank Sandro Cattacin, Florian Cova, Maxime Felder, Stefan Heeb, Laurence Kaufmann, Irina 
Radu, and Fabrice Teroni for their useful comments that helped me improve this article. 
2 For the article’s purpose, social actions are defined as intentional actions targeting other individuals  (Weber 
M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2009, [1922]). 
3 Id.  
4 Elster J., Alchemies of the mind : rationality and the emotions, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1999. 
5 Elster J., « Emotional choice and rational choice », in P. Goldie (éd.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of 
emotion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. 
6 Boudon R., Raison, bonnes raisons, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2003 ; Boudon R., Essais sur la théorie 
générale de la rationalité, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2007. 
7 Boudon R., « Une théorie judicatoire des sentiments moraux », in L’Année sociologique, vol. 54, no 2, 2004, p. 
327-357. 
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types of social action: they constitute one type of social action that admits sub-categories 
depending on the kind of normative reasoning (consequentialism, non-consequentialism) 
that social agents use.  
To this end, the article is divided into four sections. In the first one I explain why We-
ber’s typology of social actions serves as the framework for the argument and is relevant 
for social theory today. In the second section, I present the methodology Weber developed 
in Economy and Society in order to prepare the ground for my arguments, and to explain 
how my thesis differ from his. In the third section, by considering Weber’s ideas but also 
findings in experimental economics, I discuss the relationships of rationality with conse-
quentialism and non-consequentialism in order to establish that rational action out of log-
ical impossibility is normativity-dependent. In the third section, I discuss Weber’s con-
ception of affective actions and show that rationality is never devoid of affective states 
(desires, wishes, preferences, emotions, etc.); and by focusing specifically on emotions, I 
argue that emotions can be rational phenomena governing rational action and normative 
reasoning. As such, emotional actions do not seem to be a type of action sharply distin-
guishable from social actions based on rationality and normativity: rationality, norma-
tivity and emotions seem to constitute a single type of social action. 
 
II. Weber’s framework 
Weber’s typology of social actions will serve as a framework8 for my argument for five 
reasons. First, he put rationality, normativity, tradition/habits and affective states side by 
side and argued that these types constitute more or less mutually distinct categories. I say 
“more or less” because the categories he constructed were not mutually exclusive. As I 
will argue throughout this paper, these category errors seem to be due to the conceptual 
impossibility of cleanly separating rationality, normativity and emotions. I will not di-
rectly address “traditional actions” or “habits”, for I consider habits and traditions to be 
normativity-dependent. Indeed, social agents evaluate habits as good or bad and they of-
ten try to avoid bad habits and to reinforce good habits. They also evaluate traditions as 
                                                      
8 It is important to highlight that the few pages of Economy and Society—an unfinished and posthumously pub-
lished book—in which Weber sets out his theory of social actions do not contain well-formed arguments, but 
rather work notes that have been developed to varying degrees and that are not devoid of contradictions. While 
it is hard to identify a coherent theory of social action, Weber’s unfinished ideas provide a basis for thinking 
about contemporary problems. 
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being good or bad and, accordingly, as being worthy of respect or not. With these kinds of 
evaluations, it seems impossible to exclude “traditional action” from “value rationality”. I 
therefore consider that, among the various kinds of values and norms that exist, some are 
related to habits and traditions. Consequently, I will address here “purposive rationality”, 
“value rationality” and “affective action”, and will argue that they are not three different 
types of actions, but rather constitute only one type of action that brings together affec-
tivity, rationality and normativity. 
Second, the social sciences have inherited these distinctions from Weber, and many 
scholars still recognize them as partly valid9. By returning to the source of this heritage, 
my discussion of Weber’s typology will also challenge its contemporary understanding. 
Third, Weber’s conception of purposive rational actions is considered by some schol-
ars10 to be the kind of rationality that we find in rational choice theory. Therefore, dis-
cussing Weber will allow me discuss notions of rationality found in economics, and espe-
cially in experimental economics in order to develop the argument that rationality seems 
to always imply normativity in a sense that I will specify. Fourth, Weber’s contrast be-
tween purposive and value rationalities is in contemporary terminology a contrast be-
tween a rationality that involves consequentialism and a rationality that involves non-
consequentialism. Thus, it seems natural to use Weber in order to show that rationality 
and these two kinds of normative reasoning are related. Fifth, Weber’s understanding of 
affective action will help me demonstrate that rationality encompasses affective states, 
and by specifically discussing emotions I will show that emotions can be rational phenom-
ena that are connected to values and normative reasonings. Thus, my discussion of We-
                                                      
9 Typically, in analytical sociology, the distinction between purposive-rationality and value-rationality is recog-
nized by Boudon (Raison, bonnes raisons, op. cit. ; Essais sur la théorie générale de la rationalité, op. cit.), 
Hedström & Swedberg (« Rational Choice, Empirical Research, and the Sociological Tradition », in European So-
ciological Review, vol. 12, no 2, 1996, p. 127-146) and Granovetter (« A Theoretical Agenda for Economic Sociol-
ogy », in M. Guillen et al. (éd.), Economic Sociology at the Millenium, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 
for instance. But in this tradition, emotions are introduced through other authors: Elster (Alchemies of the mind : 
rationality and the emotions, op. cit.) uses Aristotle and psychologist Nico Frijda to do it, and Boudon (« Une 
théorie judicatoire des sentiments moraux », op. cit.) uses Adam Smith. 
10 See for instance Boudon (Raison, bonnes raisons, op. cit. ; Essais sur la théorie générale de la rationalité, op. 
cit.) and Demeulenaere (Homo oeconomicus : Enquête sur la constitution d’un paradigme, Paris, Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 2003).  
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ber’s ideas serves the larger purpose of emphasizing some of the fundamental links be-
tween rationality, normativity and emotions which, I argue, constitute together a type of 
social action. 
Finally let me add, that my assessment of Weber’s theses and the formulation of my 
own theses will rely on conceptual analyses informed by empirical findings. As such, the 
paper adopts a philosophical analytical stance (conceptual analysis) and mobilizes in-
sights from meta-ethics, economics, sociology and psychology. Conceptual analysis 
backed-up by empirical interdisciplinary research will therefore prove useful, on the one 
hand, for identifying and clarifying conceptual problems that are lodged at the heart of 
Max Weber’s typology of social action and, on the other hand, for formulating my own 
theses.  
 
III. Weber’s methodology 
Before assessing and elaborating on Weber’s typology of social action, it is important to 
present the methodology he developed in Economy and Society in order to prepare the 
ground for my arguments. From Weber’s methodological remarks, it is clear that each 
type of social action has the same epistemic value: the sociological explanation of a course 
of action can rely on any of the four categories constructed (purposively rational, value 
rational, affective, traditional actions), which can also be combined in social explanations. 
Nonetheless, from a methodological point of view priority is given to purposive rationality 
which stands as the paradigmatic example of meaningful intentional action: 
For a scientific approach that constructs types, all irrational, affectively condi-
tioned, meaningful contexts for behavior that influence action are best studied 
and represented as “diversionary elements” with respect to a constructed, 
purely purposively rational course for such action. For example: explanation 
of the course taken by a stock exchange panic will first establish what would 
have happened if action had not been influenced by irrational emotions, fol-
lowing which these irrational components are introduced as “disturbances”. 
[…] The construction of rigorously purposive-rational action therefore in these 
cases furthers the self-evident clarity of a sociology whose lucidity is founded 
on rationality. In this way, a type is presented (“ideal type”) in relation to which 
real and concrete action, influenced by all manner of irrationalities (affect, 
mistakes), can be understood as a “deviation” from action directed by purely 
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rational behavior11. 
A course of action has to be firstly explained by comparing it to what would have hypo-
thetically happened if agents had behaved according to the purposive rationality model. 
If the real course of action does not conform to this model, then other explanations  should 
be taken into account, which as irrational behaviors (affect, errors) consist in deviation 
from the model of pure rationality.  
This is presented as a method that has instrumental value for scientific knowledge, and 
it should not be understood as stating that in reality purposive rational actions are pre-
dominant over other motives of action. Indeed, as Weber writes,  
To this extent, and only for the purpose of methodic convenience here, is the 
method of a sociology of Verstehen “rationalistic”. This procedure should not 
be understood as a reflection of sociology’s rationalistic prejudice, but only as 
a means, a method. It should not, for instance, be reinterpreted as a belief in 
the real predominance of the rational life. It suggests absolutely nothing about 
the extent to which, in reality, actual action might or might not be determined 
by a rational evaluation of ends12. 
One should therefore not infer from the methodological priority given to purposive ra-
tionality that this kind of rationality dominates in reality. Nor should one conflate the ideal 
types of social actions, which are theoretical explanatory models, with empirical courses 
of action which are to be explained. The ideal types as theoretical approximations of em-
pirical courses of action remain to a certain degree “unrealistic”: 
Those ideal-typical constructions of social action made, for example, in eco-
nomic theory are in this instance “unrealistic” insofar as they ask: How would 
someone behave given ideal, and hence purely economically oriented, purpos-
ive rationality? The question is posed in this way to assist understanding of 
action that is not purely economically determined but that is in actuality also 
influenced by traditional constraints, emotions, mistakes, and the influence of 
                                                      
11 Weber M., Economy and Society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England, 2019 
[1922], p. 82. 
12 Id. 
Klēsis – 2020 : 48 – Perspectives wébériennes en philosophie 
 
 240 
noneconomic aims or considerations, so that we might (1) be able to under-
stand the degree to which it is actually jointly influenced in the given instance 
by economic, purposively rational motivations, or tends to be so when viewed 
as an average, or also (2) precisely because of the distance separating the ac-
tual course of events from their ideal typical course, because it aids in the un-
derstanding of real motivation13. 
Thus, Weber distinguishes between theoretical models of motivation (ideal types) and 
real motivations as they occur in social reality. So one can think that purposive rationality 
is a theoretical model that has no counterpart in real social life. Nonetheless, this conclu-
sion should be resisted since Weber also writes: 
Ideal typical constructions of this kind are, for instance, those concepts and 
“laws” developed in pure economic theory. They represent the course that a 
particular sort of human action would follow if its purposive rationality were 
rigorously formulated, its execution undisturbed by error and affect, and if, 
moreover, it were quite unambiguously oriented to one (economic) objective. 
Only in rare cases, such as the stock exchange, does action in reality follow this 
course, and then only as an approximation to that defined by the ideal type14. 
The last sentence is particularly important since it states that there would be rare in-
stances of behaviors that conform to a certain degree to the model of pure purposive ra-
tionality. One instance of such behaviors would consist in what can be observed on the 
stock exchange. In that sense, there would be in the empirical world courses of action that 
approximate pure purposive rationality. Accordingly, Weber believed that real social ac-
tions correspond to a certain degree to what theoretical models presume. Or to say it in a 
different way, each theoretical construct corresponds to real motivations to a certain de-
gree, even if those real motivations are considered to be more complex than the theoreti-
cal constructs: 
Action, especially social action, is very rarely oriented solely to the one or the 
other type. Similarly, these types of orientation are in no way exhaustive with 
respect to types of action, but are instead conceptually pure types created for 
                                                      
13 Ibid., p. 97-98. 
14 Ibid., p. 85. 
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sociological ends, to which real action more or less conforms, or from which it 
is more often combined in reality. Only their outcome can determine their util-
ity for us15. 
Interestingly, this last citation also introduces the idea that the different types of social 
action would usually be combined in reality, and that a real course of action would rarely 
conform to only one ideal type. 
So what can be drawn from this presentation of Weber’s methodology? We can see that 
these methodological remarks presuppose an opposition between rationality and sensi-
bility: emotional actions are irrational actions that consist in deviations from pure ra-
tional actions. On the contrary, I will argue in section V that this opposition is misleading, 
since emotions can be rational phenomena. I will also argue that there is no such thing as 
a purely rational type of action, since rational actions seem to always include affective and 
normative elements. Therefore, there seems to be no good methodological reason to give 
explanatory priority to purposive rationality, and as I will argue throughout this article, 
one should postulate that rational actions are motivated by affective states in relationship 
to normativity. This leads to the main epistemological thesis of this paper: social explana-
tions that rely on a rationalistic approach should recognize that rational actions always 
incorporate affective and normative elements: rationality, affectivity and normativity are 
intimately intertwined in social action. In that sense, social explanation cannot separate 
the rational, affective and normative components of social actions and construe, on this 
basis, three different types of social action as Weber, and other authors after him, like 
Boudon or Elster, did. This thesis is not equivalent to Weber’s that in reality rationality, 
normativity, and affectivity (and traditions) are most of the time combined, since this last 
thesis means that each type of social action can be combined with another one and that 
each type of social action can also in certain rare circumstances occur separately. My the-
sis is distinct in the sense that it considers that rationality, normativity and affectivity are 
necessarily combined together in social action, and that there are not three distinct types 
of social action, but only one which necessarily combines these three elements. But then 
what are the relationships between rationality, normativity and affectivity? In the next 
                                                      
15 Ibid., p. 103. 
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section, I examine relationships between rationality and normativity that are relevant for 
my argument, and I will discuss affectivity in subsequent sections. 
 
IV. Rationality and normativity 
The notion of rationality admits various conceptions16: one can speak of instrumental, 
purposive, utilitarian, economic, axiological, cognitive, procedural, situational rationality, 
etc. But an important feature of rationality is that this notion is intrinsically normative17. 
Having a “normative meaning” rationality opposes irrationality, a term that applies to an 
agent who displays a flaw in thinking (e.g. having unjustified beliefs) or in achieving an 
action (e.g. acting against one’s best judgement)18. Then, irrationality means that some 
standards of rationality were violated. These standards signify that values and norms are 
at stake. My analysis will develop a variant of the thesis that rationality has a normative 
meaning by showing that rationality is normativity-dependent because it necessarily in-
corporates various axiological and deontic notions related to consequentialism and deon-
tology19. The idea is to argue that the Weberian contrast between rational actions that 
would be normativity-free (purposive rationality) and rational actions that would be nor-
mativity-dependent (value-rationality) does not hold. Therefore, I discuss, first, rational-
ity and consequentialism, and second, rationality and non-consequentialism. 
 
IV.1 Rationality and consequentialism 
Rationality, defined as consequentialist action—that is as a rational action that aims at 
bringing out an outcome that has (alleged) good consequences for the agent or the 
                                                      
16 Demeulenaere P., Les normes sociales entre accords et désaccords, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 
2003 ; Goldthorpe J. H., « Rational Action Theory for Sociology », in The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 49, no 2, 
1998, p. 167-192 ; Zafirovski M., « What is Really Rational Choice? Beyond the Utilitarian Concept of Rationality », 
in Current Sociology, vol. 47, no 1, 1999, p. 47-113. 
17 De Sousa R., The rationality of emotion, Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England, The MIT Press, 1987 ; 
Demeulenaere P., Les normes sociales entre accords et désaccords, op. cit. 
18 de Sousa R., The rationality of emotion, op. cit. 
19 As a reminder, consequentialist normative theories can be defined as theories that demand that agents’ ac-
tions be directed to the promotion of the best possible consequences or ends; deontological normative theories, 
or to say it another way non-consequentialism, require agents to always respect certain rules of actions (keeping 
one’s promises, not lying, not humiliating others, etc.); that is, to respect them absolutely, whatever the conse-
quences (Ogien R., « La philosophie morale a-t-elle besoin des sciences sociales ? », in L’Année sociologique, vol. 
54, no 2, 2004, p. 589-606). 
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world20—, corresponds in Weber’s typology to “purposive rationality” (Zweckrational-
ität). But it is also a kind of rational action that can be found in economics. I will first dis-
cuss Weber’s idea, and then discuss rationality in economics with the help of recent find-
ings in experimental economics (EE). 
 
IV.1.1 Weber’s Zweckrationalität 
Weber21 explains that “purposive rationality” is a type of rationality that is normativity-
independent. He contrasts it with “axiological rationality” which would be normativity-
dependent, and defines “purposive rationality” as follows:  
As with any form of action, social action can be determined […] (1) by purpos-
ive rationality: through expectations of the behaviour of external objects and 
other people, and employing these expectations as a “condition” or “means” 
for one’s own rational, aspired to and weighted goals, defined as success22. 
Whoever acts in a purposively rational manner orients their action to the pur-
pose, means, and associated consequences of an act, and so rationally weighs 
the relation of means to ends, that of the ends to the associated consequences, 
and that of the various possible ends to each other; hence, action that is neither 
affective (especially not emotional) nor traditional23. 
Purposive rational actions are intentional actions where agents aspire to achieve a goal; 
they have chosen their goal among a set of goals; they use means that will allow them to 
achieve their purpose with success; and they have consciously evaluated the consequences 
that will follow from their actions. Zweckrationalität24 captures two fundamental features 
of rational action: a goal is pursued, and means are chosen in order to bring about the 
goal. Thus this notion makes reference to teleological and instrumental features of rational 
                                                      
20 Boudon R., Raison, bonnes raisons, op. cit. 
21 Weber M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage, op. cit. 
22 Weber M., Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 101. I modified the translation. 
23 Ibid., p. 102-103. 
24 Traditionally, two expressions translate the German word Zweckrationalität: “purposive rationality” and “in-
strumental rationality”. The reasons for this choice are not obvious, but they are unfortunately misleading, both 
in terms of theorizing and in terms of fidelity to Weber’s view. 
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action that are intrinsic to the definition of such actions, which always implies goals and 
means25. 
But it also involves “normativity”26. Indeed, agents are said to select the right means in 
order to have success in achieving the goal that they have selected. In this way, norms are 
stated regarding the choice of means that should be appropriate if one wants to succeed 
in achieving the goal. Agents also make evaluations about the anticipated consequences 
of their actions27, with the best anticipated consequences being chosen over consequences 
that are deemed to be not as good. Thus, a conception of a good that the action is supposed 
to bring about is involved: values as the aim of rational actions are tacitly stated. The con-
sequence is that, contrary to what Weber said, the model is not devoid of normativity: 
values and norms are already posited, and as we can see, the kind of normative reasoning 
that purposive rationality implies is consequentialism. The implication is that “purposive 
rationality” does not constitute a normativity-independent category of rationality: there 
seems to be no such thing as a logic of pure rationality that would be outside the realm of 
normativity, and that would be distinguishable from “value rationality.” 
 
IV.1.2 Zweckrationalität and economic rationality 
Since Zweckrationalität is identified by Weber and some of his commentators28 as the 
kind of rationality found in economics, this previous proposition can be further demon-
strated by discussing rationality in economics29. This will allow me to further develop the 
idea that rationality is normativity-dependent. 
                                                      
25 De Sousa R., The rationality of emotion, op. cit. 
26 Demeulenaere P., Les normes sociales entre accords et désaccords, op. cit. 
27 Habermas J., Théorie de l’agir communicationnel, tome 1 : Rationalité de l’agir et rationalisation de la société, 
trad. J.-M. Ferry, Paris, Fayard, 1987. 
28 Boudon R., Raison, bonnes raisons, op. cit. ; Boudon R., Essais sur la théorie générale de la rationalité, op. cit. 
; Demeulenaere P., Homo oeconomicus : Enquête sur la constitution d’un paradigme, op. cit. 
29 Weber (Economy and Society, op. cit.) in different places in Economy and Society defines rational economic 
action as a kind of purposive rational action (see for instance, pages 85 and 107 and in particular chapter 2 “Basic 
Sociological Categories of Economic Action”). The conception of economic action of Weber is very complex and 
it would exceed the scope of this article to present it in its full complexity. It suffices then to say that economic 
action in Weber’s view is rational, consequentialist, future-oriented, and can be motivated by economic needs 
(Weber M., Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine (« theoretische ») Nationalökonomie, J.C.B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck) Tübingen, Tübingen, 1990 [1898]), self-interest, or the pursuit of utility (Weber M., Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage, op. cit.). 
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IV.1.3 The conventional model of Homo Oeconomicus 
“Conventional economics” (CE)30 states that agents are rational, calculating, egoistic and 
self-interested and act according to their best interests, even at the expense of other indi-
viduals. Agents maximize their utility by evaluating the costs and the benefits attached to 
the outcome of their actions and choose the best outcome according to preferences that 
are considered transitive. Agents think in consequentialist terms and are future-oriented. 
This model has been criticized for several decades31. Rather than commenting on these 
well-known criticisms, I will use recent findings in experimental economics (EE) which 
take a critical stance towards CE. My focus will be on the normative concepts included in 
economics (conventional and experimental). I will show that economic rationality is not 
normativity-independent—not in the sense that the theory says what agents should do if 
they were rational32, but in the sense that these concepts are by definition normative con-
cepts that, out of logical impossibility, cannot be excluded from the normative domain33. 
 
                                                      
30 Bowles (« Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence 
from Economic Experiments », in Science, vol. 320, no 5883, 2008, p. 1605-1609) uses this expression to qualify 
economics that rely on the old picture of Homo Oeconomicus that experimental economists have falsified. 
31 See for instance Boudon R., Raison, bonnes raisons, op. cit. ; Demeulenaere P., Homo oeconomicus : Enquête 
sur la constitution d’un paradigme, op. cit. ; Elster J., Sour grapes : studies in the subversion of rationality, Cam-
bridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York ; Paris, Cambridge University Press ; Editions de la Maison des sciences de 
l’homme, 1983 ; Elster J., Alchemies of the mind : rationality and the emotions, op. cit. ; Kahneman D. & Tverski 
A., « Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk », in P. K. Moser (éd.), Rationality in action, Cambridge, 
New York, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1990 ; Simon H., « A behavioral model of rational choice », 
in The Quarterly journal of economics, vol. 69, no 1, 1955, p. 99-118 ; Tverski A. et Kahneman D., « Judgment 
under uncertainty: heuristics and biases », in P. K. Moser (éd.), Rationality in action, Cambridge, New York, Mel-
bourne, Cambridge University Press, 1990 ; Zafirovski M., « What is Really Rational Choice? Beyond the Utilitarian 
Concept of Rationality », op. cit. 
32 Elster J., L’Irrationalité : Traité critique de l’homme économique, Vol. II, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 2010. 
33 As Sandel (« Market Reasoning as Moral Reasoning: Why Economists Should Re-engage with Political Philoso-
phy », in Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 27, no 4, 2013, p. 122) would put it, but for different reasons, CE 
(Sandel does not comment on EE) is not a “value-neutral science of human behavior and social choice.”  
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IV.1.4 The logic of interest vs the logic of morality 
Experimental and anthropological economists’ findings have transformed the conven-
tional model of Homo Oeconomicus. Laboratory and field studies show that many behav-
iours across different cultures violate the hypothesis of egoism34. The canonical example 
is the experimental version of the ultimatum game. In this game, two agents—a “pro-
poser” and a “responder”—are given a certain amount of money. The proposer chooses 
how to divide the money. If the responder accepts the division, both players get the share 
that the proposer offered. If the responder rejects it, neither of them gets anything. The 
game is played anonymously; a player’s reputation is not endangered. In such a game, 
economic theory predicts that any kind of offer, even a very unequal one, will always be 
accepted: “rational selfish responders will accept any offer since some money is better 
than none, and, knowing this, proposers should make the smallest possible offer”35. How-
ever, the way people behave in the laboratory does not line up with this prediction; indi-
viduals from many societies “frequently reject low offers, and proposers, who seem to 
know this, typically propose a nearly equal division of the pot” 36. This behavior and other 
such behavior observed in various other economic games show that the postulate of ego-
ism enters into conflict with empirical observations: people care not only about the out-
come of an economic game, but also about the process through which the outcome is 
reached37 ; they care not only about what they personally gain or lose, but also about what 
other agents gain or lose and the nature of their intentions38. People thus make value judg-
ments about the outcomes and the processes of social interaction (for instance, in situa-
tions of bargaining, coercion, voluntary transfer or luck), and they manifest “strong reci-
procity”, a behavioural “predisposition to cooperate with others, and to punish (at per-
                                                      
34 Henrich J. et al. (éd.), Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from 
Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
35 Ibid., p. 2, Chapter 1. 
36 Id., Chapter 1. 
37 Gintis H. et al. (éd.), Moral sentiments and material interests : the foundations of cooperation in economic life, 
Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2005 ; Henrich J. et al. (éd.), Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments 
and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, op. cit. 
38 Gintis H. et al. (éd.), Moral sentiments and material interests : the foundations of cooperation in economic life, 
op. cit. 
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sonal costs, if necessary) those who violate the norms of cooperation even when it is im-
plausible to expect that these costs will be recovered at a later date”39. Thus, these objec-
tions show that in many situations economic agents are concerned with norms of justice 
and fairness, and that they are ready to enforce them by punishing free-riders or individ-
uals who do not act “ethically”, even when they themselves will not benefit from these 
punishments. 
How can we interpret these results in terms of rationality and normativity? These ex-
periments can be interpreted as showing that “moral values” (fairness, justice, equality, 
reciprocity, generosity) cohabit with “material interests” (wealth, profit and economic 
gain). In addition, they show that egoism does not always motivate economic behavior, 
and that altruism is also a tendency that agents can manifest through their behaviors40. 
For instance, agents can be benevolent or generous41, and they can also manifest a ten-
dency for “altruistic punishment”42; that is, a tendency to punish, without reaping any 
benefit for oneself (and sometimes at personal cost), people who act immorally. But these 
criticisms can give the impression that egoism is opposed to moral behaviors manifested 
in altruism and strong reciprocity, and that individuals behave according to two different 
kinds of logic: the logic of “interest” versus the logic of “morality” where the logic of inter-
est is not concerned with values, whereas the logic of morality is43. 
This contrast is seized in EE by the distinction between “material interests” and “moral 
sentiments”44. This translates as a difference of behavioral logic between “economic in-
                                                      
39 Ibid., p. 8. 
40 Fehr E. & Fischbacher U., « The nature of human altruism », in Nature, vol. 425, no 6960, 2003, p. 785-791. 
41 Bowles S., « Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence 
from Economic Experiments », op. cit. 
42 Fehr E. & Gächter S., « Altruistic punishment in humans », in Nature, vol. 415, 2002, p. 137-140 
43 Among others, see Elster (Alchemies of the mind : rationality and the emotions, op. cit.) who opposes interest 
and reason (i.e. morality) or Boudon (Le juste et le vrai : Études sur l’objectivité des valeurs et de la connaissance, 
Paris, Fayard, 1995) who opposes utilitarian rationality (interest) to axiological rationality (morality).  
44 Gintis H. et al. (éd.), Moral sentiments and material interests : the foundations of cooperation in economic life, 
op. cit. 
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centives” (self-interest) and “moral values” (people act “altruistically” or in other “spir-
ited-public ways”)45. But as Bowles46 observes, economic incentives and moral motives 
are “not separable” as their effects are not simply summative and independent: there are 
interactions between them. Therefore, the logic of interest and the logic of morality can 
complement or substitute each other. The behavioral effects of these motivations are then 
mutually dependent47. 
However, these theses rest on the assumption that material interest is connected to 
self-interest, egoism and various economic incentives related to economic costs and ben-
efits, whereas moral sentiments are connected to values (ethical, other-regarding, social 
preferences) that motivate pro-social behaviors48. Even if both logics are presented as not 
separable, the contrast entails the idea that values are restricted to the ethical domain and 
do not extend to the economic one. Yet, there exists plurality of values in societies49, and 
value is a term that is not exclusive to the ethical domain50. Indeed, many types of values 
exist that belong to different domains: ethical (fairness, justice), aesthetic (beauty, ele-
gance), religious (sacredness, holiness)51, vital (health, life), cognitive (knowledge, 
truth)52, economical (wealth, poverty), etc. 
In fact, what these studies show is that economic agents make their choices by weigh-
ing and pursuing different kinds of values (egoism, altruism, fairness, wealth, etc.) belong-
ing to different domains (ethics, economics, etc.). This accounts for the fact that economic 
rationality, when considered a subspecies of “purposive rationality”, is a consequentialist 
theory that involves certain kinds of goods: rational agents evaluate the outcome of their 
                                                      
45 Bowles S., « Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence 
from Economic Experiments », op. cit., p. 1605. 
46 Ibid., p. 1606. 
47 Bowles S. & Hwang S. H., « Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social prefer-
ences depend on incentives », in Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92, no 8, 2008, p. 1811-1820. 
48 Ibid., p. 1813. 
49 Boltanski L. & Thévenot L., De la justification : les économies de la grandeur, Paris, Gallimard, 2005 ; Pharo P., 
Morale et Sociologie. Le sens et les valeurs entre nature et culture, Paris, Gallimard, 2004. 
50 Pharo P., Morale et Sociologie. Le sens et les valeurs entre nature et culture, op. cit. 
51 Weber M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage, op. cit. 
52 Mulligan K., « Emotions and value », in P. Goldie (éd.), The Oxford handbook of philosophie of emotion, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
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actions and pursue economic goods as well as moral goods. Interestingly, the mutual de-
pendencies between the logic of interest and the logic of morality (i.e. the inseparability 
thesis) can be interpreted as reflecting conflicting or concordant values. Thus, setting eco-
nomic motives (egoism, acquisition of wealth, etc.) against moral values (altruism, justice, 
etc.), as is quite often done in social sciences, obscures the fact that values are not re-
stricted to the moral domain, and that just like any other kinds of values, they can conflict 
or be concordant. This shows that rationality in old and new economic models is norma-
tivity-dependent. 
 
IV.1.5 The logical structure of the normative domain 
The plurality of conflicting or concordant values signifies then that the shut out from the 
axiological domain of the “logic of self-interest” would be arbitrary. This arbitrariness can 
be further demonstrated by an examination of the logical structure of the axiological do-
main. 
The contrast asserted between the logic of self-interest and the logic of morality can be 
thought of (for the sake of simplicity) as an opposition between egoism and altruism. Yet, 
these two notions are opposing axiological concepts, with egoism considered a “disvalue” 
and altruism a “value”.  
Indeed, the domain of axiology is logically divided between “positive” and “negative” 
values53. “Positive” and “negative” values form opposing pairs, such as good/bad, bet-
ter/worse, beautiful/ugly, right/wrong, honorable/dishonorable, and utility/disutility. 
Among the values, a further distinction can be made between “thin” and “thick” values54. 
Thin values, like “good/bad” or “best/worst”, are general evaluative concepts that are de-
scriptively poor; thick values, like beautiful/ugly, courageous/cowardly, treacher-
ous/honest, are specific concepts that have both evaluative and factual contents and that 
are accordingly descriptively richer than “thin values” 55. Thin and thick values are hier-
archized: if a thing falls under a thick concept, it will also fall under a thin concept, so that 
                                                      
53 Scheler M., Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 2014, p. 
113. 
54 Mulligan K. & Scherer K. R., « Toward a working definition of emotion », in Emotion Review, vol. 4, no 4, 2012, 
p. 345-357 ; Tappolet C., Émotions et valeurs, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2000. 
55 See Williams (Ethics and the limits of philosophy, Abindgon, Routledge, 2006), to whom the distinction be-
tween thick and thin is attributed, and also Putnam (The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and other Essays, 
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it will be good or bad56. Thus, if an act is judged cruel, it will also be judged bad, and if an 
act is judged kind, it will also be judged good. 
For readers who would be reluctant to admit that the domain of axiology includes val-
ues and disvalues, it is important to note that if the axiological domain is restricted only 
to good or moral values (goodness, honesty, respect, liberty, etc.), a major conceptual 
problem arises, for these notions do not stand alone semantically: they can only be de-
fined by taking into account their “bad” counterparts (badness, treachery, disrespect, serf-
dom, etc.): “semantic is inseparable from syntactic”57. Indeed, “to fully understand the 
meaning of a [concept]”, we must consider the “syntactic context within which it is struc-
turally embedded”; that is “the way it is semiotically contrasted in our minds with other 
[concepts]”58. In fact, the mastering of “positive” concepts requires the mastering of their 
“negative” counterparts: one cannot understand concepts like goodness, respect or hon-
esty without understanding what concepts like badness, disrespect or dishonesty mean59. 
In that sense, the semantics of axiological concepts cannot be arbitrarily detached from 
the “syntactic” pairs of those concepts. 
These various dimensions of axiology help demonstrate that ER is not normativity-free. 
Indeed, egoism is an axiological concept that is necessarily related to altruism: they are 
thick concepts that describe opposite actions or predispositions; they have intrinsically 
opposing thin values, since altruism and egoism are ordinarily taken as, respectively, good 
and bad per se; and their definitions are mutually contradictory, since the concept of al-
truism is the negation of the concept of egoism, and vice versa. Nevertheless, while egoism 
is ordinarily considered, in common sense terms, to be something intrinsically bad, this 
does not mean that people cannot, depending on the situation, consider egoism to be good 
for instrumental reasons. Thus egoism, as a trait that consists in manifesting different self-
centred and other-disregarding behavioural dispositions that lead one to neglect other 
                                                      
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts  ; London, England, 2002) for further developments on the 
entanglement of facts and values in his discussion of thin and thick ethical concepts. 
56 Tappolet C., Émotions et valeurs, op. cit. 
57 Zerubavel E., Social mindscapes: an invitation to cognitive sociology, Cambridge, Massachusetts London, Har-
vard University Press, 1997, p. 73. 
58 Id. 
59 This does not mean that any individual who uses those notions is able to provide a sophisticated definition of 
them. Intuitive understandings are sufficient for “mastering” the meaning of words and for using them correctly 
in a conversation. 
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people or to consider them as instruments for one’s ends, seems to be “bad” by defini-
tion60. But when egoism is believed to bring about good things (e.g., egoism for the com-
mon good), it can be considered to have a positive instrumental value that is derived from 
the final value (e.g. an improvement in the well-being of a society) that is pursued61.  
The above description of the structure of the axiological domain shows that it is logi-
cally, semantically and syntactically impossible to extract egoism from axiology and to cut 
it off from altruism. Therefore, my comments on Weber’s purposive rationality and on 
economic rationality show that consequentialist rationality does not stand outside the 
domain of axiology. The logical implication is that consequentialist rationality is a variety 
of “value-rationality” implying consequentialism as a kind of normative theory. 
 
IV.2 Rationality and non-consequentialism 
Rational action, defined as non-consequentialism, corresponds in Weber’s typology to 
“value rationality” (Wertrationalität). I will now discuss Weber’s ideas on this kind of ra-
tionality and raise several conceptual issues that I will attempt to clarify. 
 
IV.2.1 Weber’s Wertrationalität 
The most important excerpts in Economy and Society where Weber discusses Wertration-
alität are the following: 
As with any form of action, social action can be determined […] by (2) value 
rationality: through conscious belief in the unconditional and intrinsic value—
whether this is understood as ethical, aesthetic, religious, or however con-
strued—of a specific form of particular comportment purely for itself, unre-
lated to its success […]62. 
Whoever acts in a purely value rational manner acts without regard to the fore-
                                                      
60 Baier K., « Egoism », in P. Singer (éd.), A companion to ethics, Malden, Oxford, Carlton, Blackwell Publishing, 
1993. 
61 On the contrast between different kinds of derivative (instrumental, contributive, etc.) and final values, see 
for instance Tappolet (Émotions et valeurs, op. cit.), and for bad means used for a good end see for instance 
Weber (Wissenschaft als Beruf 1917/1919, Politik als Beruf 1919, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen, Tübingen, 
1994). 
62 Weber M., Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 101. I modified the translation. 
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seeable consequences of action in the service of convictions, following the ap-
parent binding of duty, honour, beauty, religious pronouncement, piety, or the 
importance of a “cause” of whatever kind. Value rational action is in our sense 
always action made at the “bidding” or “demands” that the actor believes to be 
imposed on him or herself63. 
From the perspective of purposive rationality, however, value rationality must 
always be irrational, the more so when action is governed by absolute values. 
For the more that action elevates such absolute values, the less it reflects on 
the consequence of such action, and the more unconditional do considerations 
of inner disposition, beauty, the absolute good, and absolute duty become64. 
Weber explains that value-rational agents act in accordance with values to which they 
strongly adhere. They act without taking into account the predictable consequences 
of their actions; they follow their convictions and perform actions that are com-
manded by duty, dignity, beauty, religious directives, piety or the importance (the 
value) of a cause.  Therefore, agents whose behaviours are wertrational act in con-
formity to a rule or a requisite to which they commit themselves. This type of action 
is determined by beliefs about the intrinsic value of personal behaviour and involves 
a conscious and coherent formulation of the end that the action targets. Agents act 
with the intention of achieving the relevant action for its own sake and not in order 
to attain something else: the action has its own value, and is not performed in order 
to reach another good. 
It is surprising that Weber uses the word Wert (value), since his focus is mainly on 
deontology; that is, duties and obligations. But he seems to be saying two things that 
are not incompatible: either agents act according to duty (this is their only aim) or 
they act so as to actualize an ideal (piety, beauty) for its own sake. Nevertheless, both 
cases are similar, for in both agents act in non-consequentialist terms: they do not 
evaluate the consequences of their actions for them or for others beyond the anticipa-
tion of the results of their actions. 
                                                      
63 Ibid., p. 102. 
64 Ibid., p. 103. 
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As we can see, this definition includes both norms (duties and obligations) and val-
ues (dignity, beauty), and not merely values, as the expression “value-rationality” 
would suggest. This terminology is confusing, since the expression Wertrationalität 
(as well as its translations “value-rationality” and “axiological rationality”) obscures 
the fact that (1) the domain of normativity is constituted both of axiology (values) and 
deontology (norms), and (2) Weber is more interested in norms (duties, obligations) 
than in values65. The definition is also bizarre in that agents are depicted as targeting 
                                                      
65 To prevent various misunderstandings, it is useful to present a series of contrasts between values and norms 
that helps distinguish them and show some of their most interesting relationships. Firstly the domain of norma-
tivity is divided in two sub-domains: axiology and deontology. Axiology is the domain of values like good, bad, 
beautiful and ugly (Tappolet C., Émotions et valeurs, op. cit.). Deontology is the realm of norms; that is, of obli-
gations, prohibitions and permissions (Id.). As already said, the notion of values is understood to have a wide 
meaning that includes the domains of ethics, aesthetics, politics, religion, law, economics, etc.  Norms also con-
cern these domains: there are, for example, moral, aesthetical, political, religious, legal, economic norms 
(Demeulenaere P., Les normes sociales entre accords et désaccords, op. cit.). By virtue of the polar logical struc-
ture of the axiological domain, values can be “positive” or “negative” (Scheler M., Der Formalismus in der Ethik 
und die materiale Wertethik, op. cit.)or also “neutral” (Simmel G., Philosophie de l’argent, trad. S. Cornille, Paris, 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1987). Indeed, they are paired and opposed like in the following pairs: 
good/bad, right/wrong, courageous/cowardly, etc. Likewise, the deontological domain exhibits polar opposi-
tions: there are “positive” norms (affirmation)—one should—and “negative” norms (negation)—one should not 
(Lauria F., The Logic of the Liver : a deontic view of the intentionality of desire, Geneva, University of Geneva, 
2014 ; Massin O., « Desires, Values, and Norms », in F. Lauria et J. A. Deonna (éd.), The Nature of Desire, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 165-200). 
Taking into consideration our ordinary linguistic practices, values correspond to evaluative concepts and can 
figure in evaluative judgments, whereas norms correspond to deontic concepts—should, ought, permission, ob-
ligation, prohibition, rights and duties—that appear in deontic judgments (Ogien R., Le rasoir de Kant et autres 
essais de philosophie pratique, Paris, Tel Aviv, L’éclat, 2003). These can be expressed in sentences like: something 
ought (or ought not) to be done, ought (or ought not) be thought, ought (or ought not) be. The concept “ought”, 
from which diverse declensions (it is forbidden, permitted, obligatory) derive, can be considered the most basic 
deontic concept (Lauria F., The Logic of the Liver: a deontic view of the intentionality of desire, op. cit.) and thus 
constitutive of norms (Opp K.-D., « Social networks and the emergence of protest norms », in M. Hechter et K.-
D. Opp (éd.), Social norms, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2005, p. 234-273).  
An important feature of values is that they have degrees and are comparative (Tappolet C., Émotions et valeurs, 
op. cit.): Max can be more or less courageous; there are injustices that are bigger than others. By contrast, norms 
do not have degrees: one conforms or does not conform to an obligation (Ogien R., Le rasoir de Kant et autres 
essais de philosophie pratique, op. cit.). This does not mean that duties cannot be hierarchized according to their 
importance. But this hierarchy seems to depend on the valuations of individuals who will say, for instance, that 
the duty of not killing is more important than the duty of not lying, and depend in fine on a hierarchy of values; 
in this example, the value of life ranks higher than the value of truth. But norms have degrees in another sense, 
for they have degrees of universalism. Indeed, “you ought to respect human beings” is of a higher degree of 
universalism than “you ought to respect every woman”, which is of a higher degree than “you ought to respect 
your mother” Thus, norms can be ranked on a scale according to their universalism or relativism. 
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a goal that they have consciously and coherently worked out. This description implies 
that agents reason about different goals and means-ends relations. A further implica-
tion is that if ends are objects of choice, and if means are used in order to achieve 
goals, there are, in this respect, no differences between Wertrationalität and Zweck-
rationalität: instrumentality and teleology appear in both definitions. This contradic-
tion makes it impossible to distinguish, according to these criteria, the two types of 
rationality. As I have already noted, one cannot understand actions without reference 
to teleology and instrumentality: actions are always performed by using means in or-
der to achieve a goal. But to say that teleology is a necessary component of actions 
does not necessarily signify that consequentialism is always operative. Indeed, non-
consequentialism can also be a goal for the agent: if dishonesty is always forbidden, 
when Polly is tempted to cheat, she may choose not to do it and to act honestly in a 
non-consequentialist way—that is, by choosing to respect that categorical impera-
tive. Thus, her act has two ends: to act honestly and not to cheat66. That is why it is 
important to distinguish between acts that target ends—teleology—and the kind of 
normative reasoning that is used when acting—consequentialism or non-consequen-
tialism. In fact, the true contrast between Zweck and Wert rationality lies in this dis-
tinction between the two kinds of normative reasoning: consequentialism and non-
                                                      
Finally, values and norms stand in different hierarchical relationships. Indeed, norms seem to derive from values. 
For instance, the imperative that commands one to respect other people seems to derive from the value that 
people attach to respect. If it were not the case, this command would be meaningless. This is something that we 
can see when one asks “why-questions” about the goodness or the rightness of a norm. Indeed, to the question 
“why should I respect other people”, a common answer would be because “respect matters”. In that sense, 
norms do not only derive from values, but they are also justified and explained by values: the norm that you 
ought to respect other people can be justified by stating that the norm is good/right/appropriate, for it aims at 
enforcing or establishing respect; and respect also seems to explain why this norm exists: the norm has the func-
tion of ensuring respect, which in turn explains the raison d’être of the norm. This last point leads to an observa-
tion rarely made: norms have the function of promoting values in the world. Roughly speaking, norms are instru-
ments that aim at bringing about states of affairs that realize values. Thus the norm “you ought to respect other 
people” seems to try to prevent “disrespect” (which seems clear when one formulates the logically derived in-
terdict: “you ought not disrespect other people”) and to establish “respect”. Then, the norm seems to have the 
functions of eliminating disrespect and promoting respect among human beings. 
66 Studies in EE that investigate non-consequentialist behaviors in relationship to the ideal of honesty and eco-
nomic decision making, can be found in Gibson R., Tanner C. & Wagner A., « Protected values and economic 
decision-making », in T. Brosch et D. Sander (éd.), Handbook of Value: Perspectives from Economics, Neurosci-
ence, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 223-241. This kind of 
study shows that some experimental economists have moved away from only studying consequentialist behav-
iors. 
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consequentialism. Thus, rational action that implies teleology and instrumentality can 
rely both on consequentialism or non-consequentialism depending on the agents’ nor-
mative reasoning67. 
 
IV.2.2 Emotions, normativity and rationality 
The previous sections have demonstrated that rational actions are normativity-de-
pendent and can imply consequentialist and non-consequentialist types of reasoning. 
In the next sections I will show, first, that rational action involves affective states 
by discussing Weber’s “affective actions” and second, by focusing on emotions (a spe-
cific variety of affective states) that emotions relate to normativity and rational ac-
tions. This is the next and final step to demonstrate that rationality, normativity and 
emotions are a single type of action that have two different sub-types corresponding 
to the kind of ethics that the action involves.  
 
V. Weber’s affective actions 
The third type of social action that Weber68 mentions in his work is “affective action” 
(affektuelles Handeln) that he presents as follow: 
As with any form of action, social action can be determined […] by […] af-
fect, especially emotion: through actual affects and emotional states [Af-
fekte und Gefühlslagen]69. 
Rigorously affectual comportment likewise lies at the boundary, and often 
beyond, of what is consciously ‘‘meaningfully’’ oriented; it can be uninhib-
ited reaction to some exceptional stimulus. It is sublimated when affectu-
ally determined action involves the conscious release of feeling, in which 
case it usually, but not always, finds itself on its way to “value rationaliza-
tion”, or to purposive action70. 
                                                      
67 In fact, Weber in Politic as a vocation (Wissenschaft als Beruf 1917/1919, Politik als Beruf 1919, op. cit.) also 
distinguishes between two kinds of normative reasoning : the ethics of responsibility (consequentialism), and 
the ethics of conviction (non-consequentialism). 
68 Weber M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage, op. cit. 
69 Weber M., Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 101. I modified the translation. 
70 Ibid., p. 102. 
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Affectual and value-rational orientation of action differ in their conscious 
elaboration of the ultimate details of action and consistent planful orienta-
tion with respect to these details. Otherwise, they share in common the 
idea that the meaning of action is not contained in its eventual success but 
in the particular form taken by the action itself. He who acts according to 
emotion seeks instant revenge, instant enjoyment, instant dedication, in-
stant contemplative bliss, or seeks to satisfy through abreaction current 
emotions (no matter how great or sublime they might be)71. 
Weber considers that affective actions are not rational for they do not involve, or do 
so only minimally (they lie at the boundary of conscious intentional behaviour), the 
conscious elaboration of goals and action planning. But he also72 writes that affective 
states are understandable and provide intentions to act. Therefore, two problems 
arise when we compare “affective actions” to “purposive rationality”. First, if affective 
actions imply (even if minimally) the elaboration of a goal and action planning, and if 
they are intentional actions that aim to bring about a goal, then affective actions in-
volve teleological features of rational actions. Second, Weber73 claims that his “pur-
posive rationality” model is purely rational: it does not consist of affective states 
which are conceived as deviations of rational behaviour74. But the model is contra-
dictory as it includes different conations which can be considered affective states. In 
Weber’s definition, agents “aspire” to realize the chosen end, which means that de-
sires or wishes are stated. Preferences are also included, since agents make a choice 
from a set of goals and they choose a goal because it promotes the best consequences: 
goals are then hierarchized on a preference scale that helps to establish which goals 
are better than the others. In addition, Weber writes about “purposive rationality”:  
Alternatively, the individual can deal with competing and conflicting aims 
[by] taking “dictates” and “demands” simply as given subjective feeling of 
need arranged on a scale that is consciously balanced according to their 
                                                      
71 Id. 
72 Weber M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage, op. cit., p. 4. 
73 Ibid., p. 13. 
74 As a reminder, Weber also writes that purposive rational action “is neither affective (especially not emotional) 
nor traditional” (Weber M., Economy and Society, op. cit., p. 102-103). 
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urgency, orienting action so that they will, as far as is possible, be satisfied 
in this sequence (the principle of “marginal utility”)75. 
In this last extract, Weber talks about economic rational action which is, in his view, 
motivated by felt needs that are characterized by their urgency as he writes in his 
Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine (“theoretische”) Nationalökonomie”76. 
Therefore Weber’s model respects in fact “Hume’s dictum” that “beliefs alone can 
never provide us with motivation”77 indicating more generally that pure rational ac-
tions devoid of conations do not seem to exist. Yet, desires78, wishes79, preferences80 
and needs can be said to belong to the affective domain (just like emotions, moods, 
sentiments, visceral feelings, etc.). Indeed, occurrent conations are phenomenally 
conscious mental episodes that are felt and have intensities—they can be felt strongly 
or weakly81 and they can motivate and comprise evaluations of their objects. The im-
plications are that “purposive rational actions” and “affective actions” are not mutu-
ally exclusive categories. These defects are particularly interesting in that they more 
broadly establish that rationality and affective states are intimately intertwined and 
cannot be sharply separated; they are mutually dependent.  
The next sections will focus specifically on emotions. §5.2 provides a short working 
definition of emotion, and shows how emotions relate to values, rationality, and how 
they ground conations. §5.3 explains that emotions can ground normative judgments 
as well as imply consequentialist and non-consequentialist reasoning that relate to 
                                                      
75 Ibid., p. 103. 
76 Weber M., Grundriss zu den Vorlesungen über Allgemeine (« theoretische ») Nationalökonomie, op. cit., p. 30-
31. 
77 Sher G., In praise of blame, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 99. 
78 Frijda N. H., The Emotions, Cambridge ; New York ; Paris, Cambridge University Press ; Editions de la Maison 
des sciences de l’homme, 1986 ; Deonna J. & Teroni F., The emotions: a philosophical introduction, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2012. 
79 Deonna J. & Teroni F., The emotions : a philosophical introduction, op. cit. 
80 Scherer K. R., « What are emotions? And how can they be measured? », in Social science information, vol. 44, 
no 4, 2005, p. 695-729. 
81 For discussions about the phenomenology of desire in particular, see the edited volume by Lauria & Deonna 
(The Nature of Desire, New York, Oxford University Press, 2017) and especially the chapters by Döring & Eker, 
Friederich, and Massin. 
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rational actions. The main point is to argue that emotions, being connected to nor-
mativity and to rationality, unite these dimensions of social action into one type of 
action that has two different sub-types: consequentialism and non-consequential-
ism. 
 
V.1 Emotions 
What are emotions? Emotions are dynamic processes that affect the functioning of 
whole organism82 and are made up of several components: cognition (appraisal), 
expression (facial, corporal, vocal), motivation (cognitive and action tendencies), 
subjective feeling, neurophysiology (corporal symptoms)83, regulation of the emo-
tion (moderation, amplification, suppression)84, and language (semiotization, ver-
balisation, argumentation)85. Emotions are also characterised by their varying in-
tensity and duration86. Here, I will concentrate on the characteristics that are rele-
vant to my theses. In particular, I will show that emotions have a distinctive feature 
in that they connect individuals to values87 in different ways and that they can be 
rational88. 
 
                                                      
82 Frijda N. H., The emotions, op. cit. 
83 Sander D., Grandjean D. & Scherer K. R., « A system approach to appraisal mechanisms in emotion », in Neural 
Networks, vol. 18, 2005, p. 317-352 ; Scherer K. R., « What are emotions? And how can they be measured? », op. 
cit. 
84 Fontaine J. J. R., Scherer K. R.  & Soriano C. (éd.), Components of Emotional Meaning: a Sourcebook, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2013 ; Hochschild A., The managed heart: commercialization of human feeling, twentieth 
anniversary edition with a new afterword, Berkley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 2003. 
85 Fontaine J. J. R., Scherer K. R. & Soriano C. (éd.), Components of Emotional Meaning: a Sourcebook, op. cit. ; 
Micheli R., Les émotions dans les discours: modèle d’analyse, perspectives empiriques, De Boeck, Louvain-la-
Neuve, 2014. 
86 Frijda N. H., The Laws of Emotion, Mahwah, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2007 
87 Nussbaum M. C., Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions, New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2001 ; de Sousa R., The rationality of emotion, op. cit. 
88 De Sousa R., The rationality of emotion, op. cit. ; Solomon R. C., Not passion’s slave: emotions and choice, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2003. 
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V.1.1 Emotions and values 
Emotions are provoked by the cognitive evaluation of objects or of situations89, and each 
type of emotion corresponds to an evaluative mode90 which consists in a “seeing as”91. 
Indignation amounts to evaluating a situation that is seen as representing an unjustified 
wrong (e.g. iniquitous payments of business executives), contempt amounts to evaluating 
a person who is seen as unworthy of her social status (such as when executives are 
deemed to be dishonest or criminal). Thus, each type of emotion is identified by a type of 
value called “formal object”92: e.g. the formal object of fear is danger, of anger, offense, of 
gratitude, benevolence, etc.  
Interestingly, a relationship exists between the polarity of the axiological domain (i.e. 
“positive” and “negative” values) and emotions. Indeed, emotions that are painful are in 
many cases connected to disvalues (e.g. indignation is connected to a wrong), whereas 
emotions that are pleasant are very often connected to positive values (e.g. gratitude is 
connected to benevolence)93. 
There is also another relationship between emotions and plurality of values. Formal 
objects are “affective” values that are related to emotion-types; they contrast with “sub-
stantive” values that do not directly correspond to emotional attitudes94. In the first cate-
gory of “affective” values, we find terms like danger (fear), offense (anger) or benevolence 
(gratitude). The second category of values or “substantial” values includes values like 
beauty, courage, honor, or justice95. One should remark that emotional attitudes seem to 
be linked to substantial values that exemplify the relevant affective value. Indeed, indig-
                                                      
89 Tappolet C., Émotions et valeurs, op. cit. ; Sander D., Grandjean D. & Scherer K. R., « A system approach to 
appraisal mechanisms in emotion », op. cit. ; Frijda N. H., The emotions, op. cit. ; Frijda N. H., The laws of emotion, 
op. cit. ; Scherer K. R., « What are emotions? And how can they be measured? », op. cit. To say that emotions 
are caused by a cognitive evaluation does not mean that emotions are propositional attitudes. Indeed, cognition 
also includes perceptions, and perceptions, that are not propositional attitudes, can serve as the cognitive base 
of emotions (see for instance Deonna J. & Teroni F., The emotions : a philosophical introduction, op. cit.). 
90 Deonna J. & Teroni F., The emotions : a philosophical introduction, op. cit.  
91 Nussbaum M. C., Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions, op. cit. 
92 de Sousa R., The rationality of emotion, op. cit. ; Teroni F., « Emotions and formal objects », in Dialectica, vol. 
61, no 3, 2007, p. 395-415. 
93 Tappolet C., Émotions et valeurs, op. cit. 
94 Id. 
95 Ibid., p. 25. 
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nation as a reaction to unjustified wrongs (formal object) can target acts of cruelty, ille-
gitimate violence, and treachery (substantial values). The same can be said of admiration, 
which, as a reaction to excellence (formal object), can be felt towards actions that are cou-
rageous, benevolent or virtuous (substantial values). This means that emotions are con-
nected through their formal objects to the various kinds of positive and negative values 
that constitute the axiological domain. 
But for an emotion to arise, the person must have certain concerns96 that are under-
stood as affective sensitivities to values97 which can be socially shared98 and constitutive 
of the ethics of a society. Each type of emotion corresponds to a type of concern. Thus, it is 
because certain conceptions of what is deemed right are valued in a society that a member 
will be outraged by what is seen as an unjustified wrong, or that certain definitions of 
“virtue” (probity, honesty) are valued that a member is contemptuous of the person who 
exemplifies “vices” (dishonesty, greed).  
 
V.1.2 Emotions, rational action and target-values 
In addition, there is a general consensus in affective sciences to say that emotions have 
intimate relationships with rationality99. To substantiate this claim one can say that emo-
tions are rooted in cognitive bases (beliefs, knowledge, etc.)100 from which emotions de-
rive their rationality101. For example, if the belief that serves as the cognitive base of an 
emotion is false and/or unjustified, this belief is normatively irrational, and the emotion 
caused by the belief is, then, also irrational102. In the opposite case of a sound and justified 
belief the emotion will be normatively rational. In this sense, emotions are not always 
                                                      
96 Frijda N. H., The laws of emotion, op. cit. ; Roberts R. C., Emotions : an essay in aid of moral psychology, Cam-
bridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
97 Mulligan K & Scherer K. R., « Toward a working definition of emotion », op. cit. 
98 Salmela M., « Shared emotions », in Philosophical explorations, vol. 15, no 1, 2012, p. 1-14. 
99 Bandes S. A., « Repelant Crimes and Rational Deliberation: Emotion and the Death Penalty », in Vermont Law 
Review, vol. 33, 2009, p. 489-518 ; Barbalet J. M., Emotion, social theory and social structure : a macrosociological 
approach, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001 ; Lerner J. S. et al., « Emotion and decision making », in 
Annual Review of Psychology, no 66, 2015, p. 799-823 ; de Sousa R., The rationality of emotion, op. cit. 
100 Deonna J. & Teroni F., The emotions : a philosophical introduction, op. cit. ; Mulligan K. & Scherer K. R., « To-
ward a working definition of emotion », op. cit. 
101 De Sousa R., The rationality of emotion, op. cit. 
102 Elster J., « Rationality, emotions, and social norms », in Synthese, vol. 98, no 1, 1994, p. 21-49 ; de Sousa R., 
The rationality of emotion, op. cit. 
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irrational or factors of irrationality. Emotions also motivate rational action via their action 
tendencies. Indeed, each type of emotion possesses its own action tendencies and motivates 
types of action103: indignation the punishment of the culprit104; contempt the ostracism of 
the contemptuous105. These tendencies can generate intentions to act and therefore de-
termine the goals of the actors106: emotional actions are intentional actions107. Emotions 
also focus the attention on relevant information108 and exercise control precedence over 
the course of action in order to carry out the goals of the action tendency109. Emotions 
help to choose the means deemed to be efficient for achieving the determined goal110. In-
dignation can therefore generate the intention to punish the guilty individual through a 
fine, and contempt can generate the intention to exclude the despised person through a 
prison sentence. Indeed, emotions provide reasons to act and motivate rational actions111 
which aim to promote target-values: indignation aims to re-establish justice, contempt to 
re-establish integrity. Emotions then play a dominating role in choice and decision-mak-
ing112. 
Aside from generating intentions, emotions work as the “conative base” of other cona-
tions by motivating them113. Thus desires, wishes114 and preferences115 can be grounded 
                                                      
103 Frijda N. H., The emotions, op. cit. ; Frijda N. H., The laws of emotion, op. cit. 
104 Elster J., Explaining social behavior : more nuts and bolts for the social sciences, New York, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2007 ; Ranulf S., The jealousy of the gods and criminal law at Athens, Vol. 1 & 2, London, Williams & 
Norgate ; Lavin & Munsksgaard, 1933-34. 
105 Elster J., Explaining social behavior : more nuts and bolts for the social sciences, op. cit. ; Fisher A. H. & Rose-
man I. J., « Beat them or ban them: the characteristics and social functions of anger and contempt », in Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 93, no 1, 2007, p. 103-115. 
106 Frijda N. H., The laws of emotion, op. cit. 
107 Id. ; Solomon R. C., Not passion’s slave: emotions and choice, op. cit. 
108 Frijda N. H., The emotions, op. cit. ; de Sousa R., The rationality of emotion, op. cit. 
109 Frijda N. H., The laws of emotion, op. cit. 
110 Frijda N. H. & Mesquita B., « Beliefs through Emotions », in N. H. Frijda, A. S. R. Manstead et S. Bem (éd.), 
Emotions and beliefs, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 45-77. 
111 Elster J., Alchemies of the mind : rationality and the emotions, op. cit. 
112 Elster J., « Emotional choice and rational choice », op. cit. ; Lerner J. S. et al., « Emotion and decision making », 
op. cit. 
113 Deonna J. & Teroni F., The emotions : a philosophical introduction, op. cit. 
114 Id. ; Elster J., L’irrationalité : Traité critique de l’homme économique, Vol. II, op. cit. ; Roberts R. C., Emotions : 
an essay in aid of moral psychology, op. cit. 
115 Elster J., Alchemies of the mind : rationality and the emotions, op. cit. ; Elster J., « Emotional choice and ra-
tional choice », op. cit. See also Fehr & Fischbacher (« Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish 
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in the action tendencies of emotions. Through their action tendencies, types of emotions 
generate and provide the identity of these wants. For instance, indignation can prompt a 
desire to punish the wrongdoer, a wish that the wrong will never happen again, and a 
preference for a just world over an unjust world. Thus, by tracing back the origins of wants 
in the action tendencies of emotion-types, an emotional model of action can explain why 
types of intentions, desires, and preferences that are felt obtain, and why they motivate 
types of rational action related to types of values. But if emotions can motivate rational 
actions aimed at promoting values, how does this relate to consequentialism and non-
consequentialism? 
 
V.2 Emotions, (non-)consequentialism and rational action 
To answer this question, one has to note that emotions are also related to rationality be-
cause they influence how people think116 in generating cognitive activity. In particular, 
emotions motivate normative judgements that are intrinsic to the types of emotion experi-
enced117. For example, during an episode of indignation, a person tends to judge that a 
situation is unjust and ought to be prevented and that the wrongdoer ought to be punished 
in order to re-establish justice; during an episode of contempt, a person tends to judge 
that the despised person is unworthy, and therefore ought to be ostracised to re-establish 
probity118. This means that the constitutive normative judgements of emotions can be 
value judgements that attribute (dis)values to things, and deontic judgments that state 
rules aiming at realizing target-values. Emotions seem therefore to have the power of gov-
erning rule following: for instance, rules about making reparations seem to depend on 
guilt or rules about punishment and desert seem to depend on anger119. But the rules do 
                                                      
Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives », in The Economic Journal, vol. 112, no 478, 2002, p. C1-
C33) for the roles played by some emotions (anger, envy, notably) in the formation of social preferences in EE. 
116 Elster J., Alchemies of the mind : rationality and the emotions, op. cit. ; Frijda N. H., Manstead A. S. R. & Bem 
S. (éd.), Emotions and beliefs : how feelings influence thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
117 Nussbaum M. C., Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions, op. cit. ; Solomon R. C., Not passion’s 
slave: emotions and choice, op. cit. ; Prinz J., « The emotional basis of moral judgments », in Philosophical Explo-
rations, vol. 9, no 1, 2006, p. 29-43 ; Deonna J. & Teroni F., The emotions : a philosophical introduction, op. cit. 
118 Minner F., « L’indignation, le mépris et le pardon dans l’émergence du “cadre légal” d’"Occupy Geneva" », in 
Revue européenne des sciences sociales, vol. 56, no 2, 2018, p. 133-159. 
119 Gill M. B. & Nichols S., « Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics », in Philosophical 
Issues, vol. 18, no 1, 2008, p. 143-163. 
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not stand alone because they have an aim: to promote a value. Interestingly, the rule 
stated can correspond to categorical imperatives or non-categorical imperatives, and the 
targeted value can correspond to an “absolute and inviolable120” value that is pursued 
whatever the consequences, or it can correspond to a value simpliciter that is pursued 
because of the consequences it promotes. Therefore, emotions, as different experimental 
researchers have observed, can motivate both consequentialist and deontological reason-
ing 121. As such, emotions are parts of the system of normative reasoning122 and seem to 
be essential components of rational actions involving consequentialism and non-conse-
quentialism. 
To illustrate this point, rather than taking the example of a laboratory experiment, I 
will use a sociological study which I conducted on the political collective Occupy Geneva 
where I observed a collective moral dilemma123. This study is interesting because the di-
lemma was not a laboratory construct of the researcher, but corresponded to a real col-
lective dilemma which emerged in this social group. This dilemma is furthermore relevant 
as it opposed consequentialist and non-consequentialist reasoning and was motivated by 
two different emotions: contempt vs pity. The case depicted is therefore interesting be-
cause it shows in the natural (non-laboratory) setting of a small-scale society that ele-
ments of consequentialism and non-consequentialism can be brought together in emo-
tional reasoning and lead people to act rationally in diverging ways. But before continuing 
the argument, I need to first introduce the political collective Occupy Geneva and the 
methodology used in this study. 
                                                      
120 “Absolute and inviolable” values are called “sacred values” by Tetlock (« Thinking the unthinkable: sacred 
values and taboo cognitions », in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 7, no 7, 2003, p. 320-324) who explains that 
people who treat a value as “sacred” are not prone to accept a trade-off between this value and another value 
that they do not consider absolute and inviolable. Since the adjective “sacred” has religious connotations I will 
just use the adjective “absolute” to qualify these kinds of values. 
121 e.g. Gill M. B. & Nichols S., « Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics », op. cit. ; 
Baron J., Gürçay B. & Luce M. F., « Correlations of trait and state emotions with utilitarian moral judgements », 
in Cognition and Emotion, vol. 32, no 1, 2018, p. 116-129 ; Choe S. Y. & Min K. H., « Who makes utilitarian judg-
ments? The influences of emotions on utilitarian judgments », in Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 6, no 7, 
2011, p. 580-592. 
122 Nussbaum M. C., Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions, op. cit. 
123 Minner F., « L’indignation, le mépris et le pardon dans l’émergence du “cadre légal” d’"Occupy Geneva" », 
op. cit. 
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Occupy Geneva came into existence on the 15th of October 2011 in Geneva in Switzer-
land and dissolved around May-June 2012. This political collective had been created spon-
taneously by inhabitants of Geneva following a worldwide demonstration against the 
stock market that the Occupy movement (Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Madrid, etc.) had 
organized. The collective Occupy Geneva joined this movement, in which groups of people 
“occupied” symbolic public spaces in many cities and countries all over the world from 
Spring 2011 onwards to denounce “democratic deficiencies” and “unjust” economic rela-
tionships. It is difficult to estimate precisely the number of members of the collective, but 
it is likely that 70 to 80 people resided in the camp they settled and that the collective had 
about 350 supporters. Nonetheless, the arrival of winter, continual conflicts, and demoti-
vation led to a decrease in participation. By the time the camp was shut down, fewer than 
10 people across two tents remained. Members who took part in the general assemblies 
(GA) or the working groups (like those against economic injustices or standing for alter-
natives to capitalism) were not necessarily living in the camp, with some residing in it 
occasionally. After one week of existence and many conflicts, the members decided to 
adopt a charter of good conduct in order to regulate their interactions in the camp and 
the GAs. One month later, the same problems continued and new ones appeared. Thus, 
the members decided to amend their first charter, leading to the creation of a second char-
ter124. Finally, shortly before the shutting down of the camp, a third charter that only con-
cerned the GA had been established. It is this third charter that is the object of the study 
that I report. This study aimed at explaining the emergence of norms to punish, exclude 
and reintegrate members that were said to be “problematic” by showing how various 
emotions (indignation, contempt, forgiveness, pity, etc.) felt by the members contributed 
to the collective design and adoption of these norms. As for the methodology, the data 
were collected during a participatory observation that lasted roughly seven and a half 
months (that is the duration of the existence of the collective) which included observa-
tions of general assemblies, working group meetings, and collective actions in the public 
space. In addition, after the dissolution of the collective Occupy Geneva, I conducted 20 
semi-structured interviews about the various versions of the charter of good conduct with 
                                                      
124 Minner F., « From indignation to norms against unjustified violence in Occupy Geneva: a case study for the 
problem of the emergence of norms », Social Science Information, no 54, 2015, p. 497-524. 
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central members of the collective, among which the three members who conceived the 
third charter. 
In this collective, the issue of excluding non-cooperative members, who acted aggres-
sively against other members, became a pressing topic and lead to heated debates. While 
social exclusion was supported by many members, a few of them were convinced that it 
was a bad thing per se and were against excluding anybody even if they had behaved im-
morally towards other members; this resulted in a conflict between those who were for 
exclusion and those who were against it. I observed that those supporting it were moti-
vated by contempt, whereas those opposing it were motivated by pity. For sake of sim-
plicity, this dilemma and the debates that took place can be schematized by opposing two 
members: member A who argues for social exclusion, and member B who does not. 
Member A evaluates strongly non-cooperative members as bad people whose behav-
iours exemplified various vices (being violent, egoistic, etc.) and feels contempt. A argues 
that to exclude them would have good consequences for the group, because it would re-
store probity and social cooperation. Furthermore, for member A, social exclusion is not 
immoral when it is justified: the excluded members are responsible for their misdeeds 
and deserve to be excluded. Member A states a non-categorical imperative grounded in 
the action tendency of contempt: if non-cooperative members are bad persons, then they 
should be excluded, because it would have good consequences for everyone if they are no 
longer in the group. The excluded members’ suffering because of the exclusion is admitted 
because it is deserved: they acted intentionally and knew that they were transgressing 
the values and rules of the collective. Member A, holding these kinds of consequentialist 
beliefs, argues that she is prone to exclude members who are strongly non-cooperative, 
and to trade-off their wellbeing against their suffering for the greater good of the collec-
tive. 
Contrary to member A, member B argues that social exclusion is bad per se because 
people who are excluded always suffer from it. B sees exclusion as a disvalue which should 
not be traded-off against social integration that she relates to an absolute and inviolable 
value: the wellbeing of others. Therefore, B argues that to exclude non-cooperative mem-
bers, even if this seems justified because they are responsible for their misdeeds, consists 
in inflicting suffering on them and in violating the absolute value of another’s wellbeing. 
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The belief that the persons excluded suffer leads B to feel pity125. Motivated by pity’s ac-
tion tendency, which consists in alleviating another persons’ distress126 in order to re-
store their wellbeing, B states the rule that they should not be excluded. Thus, B is strictly 
against social exclusion and for social integration: she states the categorical imperative 
that to exclude people is strictly forbidden and justifies this interdict by saying that exclu-
sion violates the absolute value of someone else’s wellbeing. B adds that the consequences 
for the other members and the functioning of the group if those strongly non-cooperative 
members are still in the group do not matter, since the imperative of observing social in-
tegration in order not to put another’s wellbeing in danger does not admit exceptions. 
Therefore, B, motivated by pity, follows a categorical rule that aims at protecting the well-
being of the excluded whatever the consequences for the collective. 
This example of a social dilemma nourishing a social conflict is informative since it 
shows that emotions can ground consequentialist and non-consequentialist reasoning. 
This means that emotions can lead people to argue and act in opposite ways, by following 
categorical or non-categorical rules which rationally promote respectively absolute or 
non-absolute values. That is why we can say that the alleged Weberian distinctions be-
tween purposive rational action, value rational action and affective actions do not seem 
to hold. On the contrary, rationality, normativity and emotions seem to constitute a single 
type of action that possesses two sub-types depending on the kind of normative reasoning 
(consequentialist and non-consequentialist) that social agents use when they reason and 
act. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have defended the thesis that purposive rational action, value rational 
action and emotional action are not three separate types of action that compete, oppose 
or substitute for each other. On the contrary, they constitute one type of action that is 
divided into two sub-types according to the kind of normative reasoning that is at stake 
(consequentialism, deontology). To defend this view, I have examined the relationship of 
                                                      
125 Pity is often defined as a reaction to the undeserved suffering of someone else (e.g. Elster J., Explaining social 
behavior : more nuts and bolts for the social sciences, op. cit.), but in fact people who unconditionally care for 
the wellbeing of others can feel pity towards individual who deserves their misfortune. 
126 On pity’s action tendency see for instance Elster (ibid.). 
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rationality to normativity. By discussing the relationships between rational actions and 
(non-)consequentialist reasoning, I have demonstrated that rationality is normativity-de-
pendent. Therefore, there seems to be no good reason to maintain the opposition between 
a type of rational action devoid of normativity and a type of rational action that is imbued 
with normativity. In the next step, I argued for the unity of rationality, normativity and 
emotions by showing that pure rationality does not exist: affective states (desires, prefer-
ences, wishes, etc.) are always implied in a model of rationality. By specifically discussing 
emotions, I have shown that they can be conceived as rational and can give rise to rational 
actions. In addition, emotions are specific in that they connect agents to normativity (val-
ues and norms); they are also implied in normative reasoning (consequentialism and non-
consequentialism) and rational actions that are conducted according to these types of rea-
son. Rationality, normativity and emotions then constitute one single type of action that 
divides into two sub-types, according to the kind of normative reasoning that social 
agents employ when they act. In view of these arguments, it would seem incoherent to 
suppose that rational action, normative action and affective action are three different 
types of social actions, thus contradicting Weber and the tradition he inspired. In that 
sense, social explanations that rely on a rationalistic approach should recognize that ra-
tional action always incorporates affective and normative elements. 
